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Abstract: We investigate the semantics of historical counterfactuals in inde-
terministic contexts. We claim that “plain” and “necessitated” counterfactu-
als differ in meaning. To substantiate this claim, we propose a new semantic
treatment of historical counterfactuals in the Branching Time framework.
We supplement our semantics with supervaluationist postsemantics, thanks
to which we can explain away the intuitions which seem to talk in favor of
the identification of “would” with “would necessarily.”
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1 Introduction
There is a recurring idea in the semantics of counterfactuals summarized
well by the following statement: “all counterfactual conditionals express
necessitation” (Pollock, 1976, p. 34). It was shared by Lewis (1986) for
whom, as Stalnaker (1981, p. 93) neatly puts it, “the antecedents of condi-
tionals act like necessity operators on their consequents.” Recently, a similar
claim was made by Leitgeb (2012, p. 36) who takes
(A) If the match were struck, it would light.
and
(B) If the match were struck, it would necessarily light.
to be synonyms.
We do not find this semantic identification convincing. Not only we do
not think that “necessitated” reading of “would” is the default one, but we
are even uncertain if there is any non-artificial reading of “would” that has
the meaning of “necessarily would.”
Indeterministic contexts support our intuition. Consider first a fair coin
that I am about to toss and a pair of sentences:
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(C) The coin will land heads.
(D) The coin will necessarily land heads.
While we are strongly inclined to reject (D) (on the grounds that the
coin is fair), our reaction towards (C) is much more hesitant; we can even
say “Who knows, maybe.” In terms of degrees of belief, our degree of
belief in (C) is much higher (about 0.5) than our degree of belief in (D)
(about 0), which itself should suggest that we do not naturally take them to
be synonymous. Now, suppose that I could have but did not toss the coin
and consider a pair of conditionals:
(E) If I had flipped the coin, it would have landed heads.
(F) If I had flipped the coin, it would have necessarily landed heads.
We claim that our intuitive reactions towards (E) and (F) resemble those
towards (C) and (D) respectively. Similarly, our degree of belief in (E)
(about 0.5) is much higher than our degree of belief in (F) (about 0). We
think that just as (C) and (D) clearly differ in meaning, so do (E) and (F).
Observations of this sort support the view that “would” should not be be
identified with “necessarily would.”
To validate our intuition we develop, against the background of the the-
ory of branching time (section 2), a novel semantic treatment of counterfac-
tuals (sections 3 and 4). We combine our semantics with supervaluational
postsemantics (section 5) and use this rich conceptual apparatus to explain
the subtle affinity of plain and necessitated counterfactuals (section 6).
We choose the branching-time setting since it suits the discussion of in-
determinism especially well. This setting has already been used for analysis
of counterfactual future contingents (Placek & Müller, 2007; Thomason &
Gupta, 1980). However, our semantic approach is, as far as we know, a
novel one. We will minimize the discussion of the formal part of the the-
ory to the necessary minimum, leaving the full description of the formalities
involved for a different paper.
2 Branching time
Branching time is a natural way of representing how possibilities evolve
in time. The framework aims at explicating the idea that some eventual-
ities which are possible at some earlier time cease to be possible at later
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times. It is also meant to capture the intuition that the future, contrary to
the past, is open to multiple possible realizations. Additionally, it incorpo-
rates the observation that what is possible and what is settled is very much
circumstance-dependent: what is possible at a given moment depends on
what the world is like at this very moment (such situation-dependent neces-
sity was sometimes called “accidental necessity” in the scholastic terminol-
ogy).
All these intuitions are meant to be captured by a pictorial representation
of temporal possibilities in the shape of a tree which branches upwards,
but never downwards. Each point at a tree represents a possible state of
the world – these possible states are called “(possible) moments”. At a
given moment, each “branch” growing out of a given moment represents its
possible future continuation while the “trunk” of the moment represents its
unique possible past. Each maximal line throughout the tree represents a full
possible course of events – a “(possible) history”. (“Moment” and “history”
will be used as technical terms from now on.)
Here is an example of a simple branching-time structure used as a depic-
tion of the coin-tossing story we introduced above:
m3 No coin toss
m1 Decision whether to toss
heads tails
m2 Coin toss
h1 h2 h3
Figure 1: Coin toss
Formally put, a branching time (BT ) structure is a partially ordered set
(i.e. the ordering relation is reflexive, weakly antisymmetric, and transi-
tive) satisfying the extra condition of no backward branching (or simply
backwards-linearity):
• ∀m,m1,m2
[(
(m1 < m) ∧ (m2 < m)
)
→
(
(m1 < m2) ∨ (m2 <
m1) ∨ (m1 = m2)
)]
.
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Elements of the set represent possible moments (and will be called “mo-
ments”), and the ordering represents the relation of earlier-possibly later. A
“history” is a maximal linearly ordered subset of the set.
To give a formal account of our idea, we need an extra notion of “co-
presence” relation (∼) defined on possible moments. Two moments stand in
this relation if and only if they happen at the same time, possibly in different
histories. Formally, (∼) is an equivalence relation on possible moments, the
standard definition of which can found in (Belnap, Perloff, & Xu, 2001,
pp. 194–195).
Branching time structures are meant to interpret the language in which
we talk about the future, past, and temporal possibility; it is often used as
a model for the propositional language with temporal operators “It will be
the case that” (F) and “It has been the case” (P) and a modal operator of
historical possibility (♦). In the standard Ockhamist semantics, the truth
value of a sentence depends on both a moment and a history at which it is
evaluated. (Sentences are evaluated at moment-history pairs m/h such that
m ∈ h.) For example, the sentence Fφ is true at a moment-history pairm/h
if and only if there is a later moment m′ in history h at which φ is true. A
modal sentence ♦φ is true at moment-history pair m/h if and only if there
is a history h′ “passing through” m (i.e. min h) such that φ is true at m/h′.
3 Semantics of historical counterfactuals
Since we want to use BT structures to model the behavior of counterfac-
tuals, we need to introduce an additional two-argument operator >. The
basic idea behind the semantic interpretation is rather standard for the pos-
sible world setting: the truth value of a counterfactual at a moment-history
pair, depends on whether the consequent is true at the “closest”1 moment-
history pair at which the antecedent is true. The BT structure provides a
very natural account of “closeness” of possibilities. From the perspective of
a moment-history pairm/h, the closest alternativem′/h′ is the one that (a)
makes the antecedent true; (b) the history h′ “branched off” the history h as
recently as possible to make the antecedent true; and (c) the moment m′ is
co-present with the momentm. Thus, to evaluate the counterfactual, we are
looking for the history which shares as much past as possible with the actual
history; in other words, the history which deviates from the actual history as
recently as possible to make the antecedent true now.
1Yes, of course there might be ties. Hold on, we will deal with this.
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To give a formal account of this idea we follow the lead of Stalnaker
(1968) and add a selection function parameter of truth. A selection function
s takes as its argument a pair consisting of sentence φ and a moment-history
pair m/h, while delivering as its value the “closest” moment-history pair
m′/h′ such that:
1. φ is true at m′/h′ (m′/h′  φ),
2. m ∼ m′, i.e. m is co-present with m′,
3. ∀m′′∀h′′((m′′ ∼ m ∧ (h ∩ h′ ⊂ h ∩ h′′))→ m′′/h′′ 
 φ).
For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the possibility of ever-closer φ-
histories and counterfactuals with historically impossible antecedents (if
you require a stance on the latter issue, we suggest you follow the lead of
Thomason and Gupta (1980, p. 74) and declare all such counterfactuals as
true).
We also ignore, due to the limitation of space, the so-called “late depar-
ture” problem and counterfactual future contingents like “If I had bet tails,
I would have won” which are notoriously difficult to tackle in the simple
BT setting (examples of this sort are discussed in Placek & Müller, 2007;
Thomason & Gupta, 1980).
It is important to note that conditions 1–3 above under-determine the
choice of a selection function. This is clearly visible in indeterministic con-
texts. Take the coin toss model above (Figure 1 two pages earlier): the
heads-history h2 branches off the history h1 at the same moment as the tails-
history h3. Therefore, both these histories are equally viable candidates for
values of a selection function for the argument 〈coin toss,m3, h1〉. It is a
very important feature of our semantics which we are happy to embrace.
With the selection function at our disposal, we can define the truth con-
ditions of a counterfactual connective >:
Definition 1 (Counterfactual) m/h, s  φ > ψ iff s(φ,m/h), s  ψ.
So, a counterfactual is true at a triple moment-history-selection function
m/h, s iff the selection function s when given the antecedent of the coun-
terfactual and the m/h pair as its argument gives back a moment-history
pair at which the consequent is true. Observe that the truth of a sentence is
relative to a selection function while the definition of the selection function
appeals to the notion of truth. To avoid circularity, we define  and the set
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of all selection functions bottom-up by use of double induction. The curious
reader can consult the rigorous definition stated in Appendix B.
Already at this point we have achieved some interesting goals. Our se-
mantics generates some validities we desire to preserve. For example, the
counterfactual law of excluded middle (A > B) ∨ (A > ¬B) is valid and
what we believe to be the natural interaction of counterfactual with negation
is preserved, i.e. ¬(A > B) ↔ (A > ¬B) is true (unless A is a historical
impossibility).
4 Counterfactuals and historical modality
The notion of historical necessity is inherently local. However, introduction
of a counterfactual connective indicates “the transition to a tense logic in
which what is true at moments co-present with i can be relevant to what is
true at i” (Thomason &Gupta, 1980, p. 78). This significantly influences the
behavior of historical possibility, especially when the whole counterfactual
is inside the scope of the possibility operator. In such cases, to determine
what is necessary and what is possible at a given moment, we need to take
into account what must and what could have happened at different moments,
situated in alternative scenarios. For example, to determine whether “It is
possible that if yesterday I had met a person in need, I would have helped”
is true, I need to know the possible outcomes of the encounter I could have
had the day before.
To take these alternative scenarios into account, we need to modify the
behavior of the possibility operator, extending the domain of quantification
in its semantics. So far, to determine what is possible, we had to take into
account the histories passing through the moment of evaluation only, but as
soon as counterfactuals are introduced, we need to somehow consider the
counterfactual possibilities. We propose to do it in the following manner:
Definition 2 (Possibility) m/h, s  ♦φ iff ∃s′∃h′m/h
′, s′  φ.
Thus, ♦φ is true at a moment m, history h passing through that mo-
ment and according to the selection function s iff there is a history passing
through that moment which makes φ true according to some selection selec-
tion function s′. (We preserve the natural duality of modalities:  = ¬♦¬.)
Thanks to this definition we can semantically distinguish “plain would”
counterfactuals from “necessitated would” counterfactuals. The coin toss
model from Figure 1 can serve as a paradigm example: on the one hand, at
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m3/h1 the sentence “If I had tossed the coin it would have landed heads”
(coin toss > F heads) is either true or false depending on the choice of the
selection function.2 On the other hand, the sentences “If I had tossed the
coin it would have been necessary that it would land heads” (coin toss >
 F heads) and “Necessarily, if I had tossed the coin it would have landed
heads” ((coin toss> F heads)) are both false independently of the choice
of the selection function. We will give a more thorough interpretation of this
phenomenon in the next section.
Simultaneous introduction of possibility and counterfactual operators to
the language opens a research perspective regarding their interactions. The
pioneering research in this domain has been conducted by Thomason and
Gupta (1980). Our definitions significantly differ and simplify those of our
predecessors, nonetheless, we were able to restate some of their results. The
conclusions of our preliminary research can be found in appendix C.
5 Semantics and postsemantics
To further explore the behavior of plain and modal counterfactuals we use
the conceptual apparatus of John MacFarlane (2003, 2014), who distin-
guishes truth-at-an-index () from truth-at-a-context (). The first notion
of truth is largely a technical tool of a given semantic theory. It is used to
guarantee that the semantic theory validates intuitive tautologies and rules
of inference. It is also meant to guarantee the natural interaction between
different logical connectives. Moreover, it is used to explicate the notion
of truth-at-a-context. This last notion is more closely related to the ordi-
nary practice of speech. At some points (e.g. 2014, p. 208) MacFarlane
even suggests that a sentence’s truth-at-a-context is sufficient and necessary
for accuracy of an assertion of that sentence in that context. MacFarlane
calls the theory of truth-at-an-index “semantics” and the theory of truth-at-
a-context “postsemantics”. For our simple application, the context might be
reduced to the moment on the tree where the sentence is used; in turn, the
index reduces to the moment-history-selection function triple.
Following Kaplan (1989) and Belnap et al. (2001) we understand the no-
tion of the context as metaphysically loaded (it represents some aspects of
the world at the moment of utterance), therefore taking the notion of truth-
at-a-context to be metaphysically relevant as well. Specifically, we assume
2Perhaps the antecedent in the formal representation of the sentence should include the P
operator; we ignore this issue as it is not important for the current task.
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that the sentence is true-at-a-context if and only if the context is sufficient
to ground the truth of that sentence at that context. We do not believe there
is anything in the context of use of the counterfactual in virtue of which the
counterfactual is true; at the same token we think that there is nothing in
virtue of which the negation of the counterfactual is true. Consequently, we
propose a postsemantic theory according to which neither a counterfactual
future contingent nor its negation is true at a context at which it is used. It
turns out that given the semantic definitions we proposed, it is sufficient to
slightly generalize supervaluationism of Thomason (1970) to get the appro-
priate result.
Definition 3 (Truth-at-a-context)
m  φ iff ∀s∀h m/h, s  φ.
That is, a counterfactual is true-at-a-context only if the choice of a “max-
imally close” counterfactual scenario (i.e. of a selection function) makes no
difference since all the maximally close alternatives make the consequent
true. The counterfactual is false-at-a-context if and only if its negation is
true-at-a-context. This definition of postsemantics is very close in spirit to
the theory of counterfactuals advocated in (Stalnaker, 1981).
Such a postsemantics generates the desired result: Every counterfactual
future contingent is neither true nor false at the context of its use. Take again
the coin toss model from Figure 1, p. 3 as an example. At the context m3
neither “If I had tossed the coin, it would have landed heads” nor “If I had
tossed the coin, it would not have landed heads”3 is true:
m3 
 coin-toss > F heads & m3 
 coin-toss > ¬F heads.
It is so because the truth-at-an-index of each of these counterfactuals cru-
cially depends on the choice of selection function. At the same time, the
postsemantics guarantees that the disjunction of the two is true at context
m3:
m3  (coin-toss > F heads) ∨ (coin-toss > ¬F heads).
Interestingly, A > B and (A > B) are true at the very same contexts, but
they might be false at different contexts! This observation brings us to the
last section of the paper.
3Remember that in our semantics “If I had tossed the coin it would not have landed heads”
is equivalent to “It is not the case that if I had tossed the coin it would have landed heads.”
		
Towards a New Theory of Historical Counterfactuals
6 Giving necessitarians their due
In this part, we try to explain away the lure of the idea that all counter-
factuals should be read in the strong, necessitated sense. One of the most
distinguished proponents of this idea is David Lewis (1986) who motivates
this approach by the observation that to reject a counterfactual like “Had I
tossed the coin, it would have landed heads,” it is often enough to say “No!
If you had tossed the coin, it might have landed tails.” (p. 8). Since it is
sufficient to use a might-not-counterfactual to deny a would-counterfactual,
it is tempting to hold that a “would” has something of a “must” in it. Since
we try to resist this temptation, we need to explain away Lewis’ observa-
tion. We believe (in line with the views of Stalnaker, 1981) that the phe-
nomenon is postsemantic rather than semantic in nature and that it should
be explained by the criteria of correctness of assertions rather than by the
semantics of counterfactuals. We can utilize the notion of truth-at-a-context
to this purpose if we accept the following norm:
Definition 4 (Truth norm of assertion) An act of assertion is correct in a
context only if the sentence asserted is true at that context.
This norm of assertion together with supervaluational postsemantics nat-
urally generates correctness gaps. Since counterfactual future contingents
are true at no contexts, they can never be correctly asserted. For example,
neither “If I had tossed the coin, it would have landed heads,” nor “If I had
tossed the coin, it would not have landed heads” can be correctly asserted.
Consequently, one can correctly assert a counterfactual only if it is settled.
To show that a counterfactual is not true at a given context it suffices to
establish that it might false. Together with the truth norm of assertion, it
follows that such a counterfactual cannot be correctly asserted. This fact
can be summarized by the following postsemantic theorem:
m 
 ψ > φ iff m  ♦(ψ > ¬φ).
Therefore, it is enough to establish possibility of falsity of a counterfactual
to undermine the right to assert it. It is the reason why we can deny “If I had
tossed the coin, it would have landed heads” with “If I had tossed the coin,
it might not have landed heads.”
This postsemantic fact also explains why it is never correct to assert “If
I had tossed the coin it would have landed heads, but if I had tossed it, it
might not have landed heads.” The reason is not that the sentence is self-
contradictory, as Lewis would have us believe, but because the sentence is
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true in no context and as such can never be correctly asserted; that is, for
any m in any model:
m 
 (φ > ψ) ∧ ♦(φ > ¬ψ).
Therefore, the intuition that “would” has a necessitating force is explained
by a general linguistic mechanism (truth norm of assertion) rather than by
the specific modal strengthening of the meaning of “would”. Observe that
the very same mechanism is at play in different kind of contexts. For exam-
ple: “I were at the party, but possibly I weren’t” sounds just as strange, but
we do not conclude that the sentence is self-contradictory.
We noted in Section 4 that plain and necessitated counterfactuals can be
semantically distinguished. This fact has a postsemantic consequence: even
though would- and would-necessarily-counterfactuals are true at the very
same contexts, they are false at different contexts (i.e. their negations are
true at different contexts); that is, there is a model with a moment m such
that:
m  ¬(φ > ψ) and m 
 ¬(φ > ψ).
Any indeterministic example can attest to that. Let us get back to the coin
tossing example. The sentence, “If I had tossed the coin, it would neces-
sarily have landed heads,” is false, while the sentence, “If I had tossed the
coin, it would have landed heads,” is neither true nor false. We think that it
follows the linguistic intuition rather well. It also suggests that the semantic
identification of “would” and “necessarily-would” is not justified.
Lastly, let us come back to the issue of the relationship between coun-
terfactuals like (A) and (B) (p. 1). Again, we see a postsemantic rather than
semantic connection. There are two ways of describing our point.
First, it is sometimes maintained (see e.g. Stalnaker, 1981) that counter-
factuals whose natural language formulation includes a word like “neces-
sarily” in the consequent have the logical form in which the corresponding
modal operator stands in front of the whole formula, so e.g. “If the match
were struck, it would necessarily light” has the logical form of (A > B).
If we take this route, notice that in our framework the following rules hold:
m  (φ > ψ)
m  (φ > ψ)
m  (φ > ψ)
m  φ > ψ
Second, if we insist that the aforementioned sentence has the logical
form of A > B, then the issue is more subtle, but the connection of the
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two is still close enough. The sentence φ > ψ does follow from φ > ψ
and the converse entailment holds under an assumption (satisfied by most
everyday counterfactuals, including those used in Leitgeb’s example) that
the antecedent of the counterfactual is not a future contingent. We can ex-
press these two observations in the form of the following rules:
m  (φ > ψ) ∧ (φ > φ)
m  φ > ψ
m  φ > ψ
m  φ > ψ
The bottom line is that sentences used in Leitgeb’s examples – coun-
terfactuals and necessitated counterfactuals – are not synonymous, but their
affirmations are assertible in exactly the same contexts, which explains why
they look like synonyms.
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B The details of the truth definition
Introductory comments:
• Assume M/H is the set of all moment-history pairs of a given BT
model such that m ∈ h; when we write m/h ∼ m′/h′ we mean “m
is co-present with m′”.
• Assume the issue of everywhere false antecedents is dealt with in
some suitable way; e.g. declare that all such counterfactuals are true.
• Assume the standard definition of Ockhamist truth BT .
Definition 5 (Alphabet) The alphabet of our language consists of:
	
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• countably many propositional variables;
• parentheses;
• connectives: ¬, ∧, ♦, F, P, >.
Definition 6 (Formula)
1. Every propositional variable is a formula;
2. If φ, ψ are formulas, then ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ, Fφ, Pφ, ♦φ, φ > ψ are;
3. Nothing else is a formula.
The class off all formulas is denoted by F; the class of formulas which do
not contain > is denoted by F0.
Definition 7 (Degree of a formula) The degree of a formula φ is denoted
by deg(φ) and is defined as follows:
• For φ ∈ F0, deg(φ) = 0;
• For φ ∈ {¬ψ,Fψ,Pψ,♦ψ}, deg(φ) = deg(ψ);
• For φ = ψ ∧ χ, deg(φ) = max(deg(ψ), deg(χ));
• For φ = ψ > χ, deg(φ) = max(deg(ψ), deg(χ)) + 1.
The symbol Fn denotes the set of all formulas of degree up to – and includ-
ing – n.
B.1 Base step
• S0 :=
{
s : F0 ×M/H →M/H | ∀m/h ∈M/H,φ ∈ F0
– s(φ,m/h) BT φ;
– s(φ,m/h) ∼ m/h;
– ∀m′′/h′′ ∈M((m′′ ∼ m)∧ (h∩h′ ⊂ h∩h′′)⇒ m′′/h′′ 
BT
φ), where h′ is the history in s(φ,m/h)
}
.
The parameters for 0 are moment-history pairs from M and selection
functions from S0; the full definition of 0 is as follows, for φ ∈ F0:
Definition 8 (0-truth)
m/h, s 0 φ iff m/h BT φ
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B.2 Inductive step
In what follows, s|n is the restriction of the selection function s to formulas
in Fn.
Definition 9 (Class of all n-selection functions Sn) An n-selection func-
tion is a function s : Fn ×M/H →M/H such that:
1. s|n−1 ∈ Sn−1
2. for any φ ∈ Fn and m/h ∈M/H:
• s(φ,m/h), s|n−1 n φ;
• s(φ,m/h) ∼ m/h;
• ∀m′′/h′′∈M/H((m
′′ ∼ m) ∧ (h ∩ h′ ⊂ h ∩ h′′)⇒
m′′/h′′, s|n−1 
n φ) where h
′ is the history in s(φ,m/h)
}
We can now proceed with the “meat” of the induction step. Assume that
n−1 and Sn−1 are given and that φ ∈ Fn. The parameters for n are
moment-history pairs and and selection functions from Sn−1.
Definition 10 (n-truth)
• for φ ∈ Fn−1:
m/h, s n φ iff m/h, s n−1 φ;
• for φ, ψ ∈ Fn−1:
m/h, s n φ > ψ iff s(φ,m/h), s n−1 ψ;
• for φ, ψ ∈ Fn \ Fn−1:
– m/h, s n ¬φ iffm/h, s 
n φ
– m/h, s n ψ ∧ φ iff m/h, s n ψ and m/h, s n φ
– m/h, s n Fφ iff ∃m′>mm
′/h, s n φ
– m/h, s n Pφ iff ∃m′<mm
′/h, s n φ
– m/h, s n ♦φ iff ∃s
′ ∈ Sn−1∃h
′ ∈ H m/h′, s′ n φ
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B.3 Final definitions
We will now construct the “general” selection functions, that is, functions
which are not defined for formulas up to some particular degree, but for
arbitrary formulas. Each member of the set S+ defined below is a “proto-
selection function”, that is, a set of selection functions containing exactly
a single function of each degree such that for any two of those one is an
extension of the other.
Definition 11 (Set S+ of all proto-selection functions)
S+ :=
{
s+ ⊂
⋃
n∈N Sn|
• ∀n∃!s such that s ∈ Sn and s ∈ s
+
• ∀s′,s′′,m if s
′, s′′ ∈ s+, and s′ ∈ Sm, and s
′′ ∈ Sm+1, then s
′′|m =
s′
}
The required selection functions are simply unions of proto-selection
functions:
Definition 12 (Set S of all selection functions) S := {s|s =
⋃
s+, for
some s+ ∈ S+}
By relativization of truth to a choice of a selection function s ∈ S we
arrive at our ultimate definition of truth (we omit as obvious the parts con-
cerning classical and temporal connectives):
Definition 13 (Truth)
• m/h, s  p iff m/h BT p
• . . .
• m/h, s  φ > ψ iff s(φ,m/h), s  ψ
• m/h, s  ♦φ iff ∃s′∈S∃h′∈H m/h
′, s′  φ
C Reasoning with modalities and counterfactuals
Let us present some results of our explorations of the interplay of historical
counterfactuals with historical necessity. To begin with, consider the pair of
sentences:
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• It is possible that if I had met a person in need yesterday, I would have
helped.
• If I had met a person in need yesterday, it would have been possible
that I would help.
These two seem to be synonymous; they seem to be true (or false) together
and for the very same reason: our readiness (or lack thereof) to help.
Examples like these suggest that, as far as historical possibility is con-
cerned, it makes no difference whether the modal operator takes a wide or
a narrow scope with respect to the counterfactual; this would indicate the
validity of the following rules of inference:
(narrow-to-wide)
φ > ♦ψ
♦(φ > ψ)
(wide-to-narrow)
♦(φ > ψ)
φ > ♦ψ
If these rules were valid, it would open a new perspective on the debate
regarding the scope ambiguity of might-counterfactuals. Prima facie, the
sentence like “Had I flipped the coin, it might have landed heads” can be
understood either as φ > ♦ψ or as ♦(φ > ψ). Given the validity of the
rules, the scope ambiguity would make no difference, at least as long the
historical modalities were concerned. With our semantic definitions, we can
establish that in most cases, such two sentences are indeed equivalent, but
in full generality, neither of the two inferences are valid. The following two
examples show the invalidity of the two above rules under our semantics.
m1 Decision whether to run for president
h1
m2 Election dayWill not be president m3
Is president
unhappy
h2
Is not president
happy
h3
1
Figure 2: Potential election
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The first case, illustrating the failure of the narrow-to-wide rule, uses an
antecedent which is counterfactually contingent; that is, it is a sentence in
the future tense which is not settled at the moment-history pair we “jump to”
using the selection function. Consider Figure 2; the model obviously uses a
lot of idealization but is just an illustration of a technical point. Suppose we
had made the decision not to run for president;m3 occurs on the date of the
election in which, in h1, we do not take part in the election. Consider the
sentence, “If I were to become president, I might be happy” (F president >
♦F happy).
For an arbitrary selection function s, we have that s(F president,m3/h1)
= m2/h2, where the sentence “♦F happy” is true (due to the existence of
h3, where we turn out to be not elected, but happy). However, keeping the
same s, we see that atm3/h1, s the sentence “♦(F president> F happy)” is
false: there is no selection function which would make us jump to moment-
history pair in which both “F president” and “F happy” hold. Thus, it is
not possible that if I were to be elected, I would be unhappy. Therefore the
narrow-to-wide principle fails in full generality; however, it holds when we
restrict our attention to counterfactuals with antecedents speaking about the
settled past (or, in general, antecedents φ such that φ > φ).
The converse inference fails for an unrelated reason. Consider a model
which illustrates the following scenario (Figure 3). There are two rigged
coins in a box, a double-headed coin and a double-tailed coin. At moment
m0, I can draw and later toss one of the coins from the box. In history
h1, I draw a double-headed coin, in history h3, I draw a double-tailed one
and in history h2, which is the actual one, I decide not to draw any coin at
all. Let us take a moment m2 in history h2 and a selection function s such
that s(toss,m2/h2) = m3/h3. Then we have that m2/h2, s  ♦(toss >
F(heads)), but m2/h2, s 
 toss > ♦F(heads).
We have stated the rules in terms of ♦, but they can be equally well stated
in terms of  as the following two equivalences hold:
φ > ♦ψ
♦(φ > ψ)
iff
(φ > ψ)
φ > ψ
and
♦(φ > ψ)
φ > ♦ψ
iff
φ > ψ
(φ > ψ)
Since we cannot get the most general rules of inference we pursued, we
can try the “second best”. Consider the following strengthening of the so
called “Edelberg inferences” advocated by Thomason and Gupta (1980):
(Edelberg)
(φ > ψ)
φ > (φ→ ψ)
(Weak Edelberg)
φ > φ, (φ > ψ)
φ > ψ
	
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Drawing a coinm0
h1 h3
toss > F(heads)
m2
h2
toss, F(heads) toss, F(tails)
m3
1
Figure 3: Two rigged coins
To validate these, the authors replaced the notion of history with a highly
complex concept of a “future choice function”, and then impose as many as
9 conditions on selection functions. Interestingly, the three simple require-
ments on selection functions we proposed above, together with our defini-
tion of possibility, are sufficient to validate both these inferences (we omit
the formal details). We take it to be an advantage of our theory over the
theory of Thomason and Gupta.
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